Gulf War Was A Perfect Television War Media Essay

disconnect fight Was A Perfect Television fight Media influenceThe media re passation of fights has signifi wadtly changed over last years. Previously organism right an instrument of reporting and propaganda, now media atomic number 18 con placementred a competent weapon. The contend of concrete objects is partially being replaced by the state of contend of pictures and sounds, instruction contend (Virilio, 2002). On the one hand, selective instruction technologies can be regarded as gentle weapon, because they lead to the fewer amounts of victims. On the other hand, they directly influence the affable structures, can fulfill the conscious with unreasonable images or distort the perceptions, splay moral panics or create virtual enemies and thus atomic number 18 an expert weapon of mass distruction.One of the famous works about the consumption of in micturateation technologies in the war belongs to French sociologist Jean Baudrillard, and his concept of the di sjunction struggle 1991 as the first video war will be assessed in the essay in correlation with his theories of hyper realism and simulacrum. Those concepts are use to the media representation of the mesh in randomness Ossetia. The efficaciousness of the concept of tv set war for understanding modern conflicts is proved in conclusion.Hyper truthfulness, simulacrum and selective information warsPhilosophical approach of Baudrillards works is concentrated around two principal(prenominal) nonions -hyper reality and simulacrum. twain terms are related to the reality of the consumer society. correspond to Baurillard, we all stand up in the world, dominated by organized perceptions, piece raft loose an ability to perceive the real surrounding. Instead they slip artificial or adapted environments assembled chronicles of multitude operations, coverage of suicidal terrorist acts. Baudrillard (1996) claims that the reality is not only possible to represent, the reality shou ld al centerings be get to for representation and thus it becomes a hyper reality, existing only in simulation. It consists of media and cultural images that simulate the real world. Some of this images are representations of real objects, entirely rough information technologies, picture and particularly advertisement create special images, deceiving representations of non-existing objects, which Baudrillard (1998), adjacent Plato, calls simulacra. In postmodern culture, dominated by TV and Internet, the notions of true and false representations are destroyed, as people befool access only to simulations of reality, which is no to a greater extent real than the simulacra representing it. Moreover, we start to believe the maps of reality as much real than own experience and cut the hyper reality as the existent environment (Mann, n.d.). Consequently, simulacra, which lost every connection to real things, dont hold back fender or prototype, and can reduplicate round obj ects, change the notion of counterfeits or false.So a correlation appears that hyper reality becomes the athletic field and the simulacra the intellectual weapons in conflicts of all takes, from the business competition to wars amongst countries, which gradually turn into information wars.The most wide give out technique of typic images usage in information war is propaganda, entirely now in the form of tradeing or PR campaigns. Such campaigns provide the basis for phalanx operations and are a perfect tool to make conform to one side or type of thinking. Thus they are the most integrated and hidden, scarcely also the most pervasive parts of the modernistic-fashioned wars. The censorship is wide give, because the military-media campaigns pick up a gap between the fifty-fiftyt and the interview, and censorship breaks the flow of information, small-arm propaganda specialists feed media with false information (Snow, 2003). In these terms coverage of military operations is now able to influence their process as it was, for example, in the movie Wag the dog, where imaginary war actions of American troops in Albania, staged to shift public interest from the reputation crisis of the president, led to real military repartee.So, the role of media in the modern wars is not limited to newsworthiness service coverage or propaganda, the media now should be regarded more deally as the ordinal front of war. The reasons for it could be different. According to sociologist Paul Virilio (2002), the escalation of cybernetic wars of purview and propaganda is the result of graduate changes in weapons. The first, prehistorical, wars were tactical and apply weapons of obstruction (ramparts, fortresses). The term of political wars made them strategic and reliable on weapons of destruction (bows, missiles). The new period of transpolitical wars is characterized as logistical and uses weapons of intercourse (telephone, radar, satellites, information carriers), whi ch emerged due to world(a) information networks and tele-surveillance. The turning point of modern epoch is the integration of media and industrial army, where the capability to war without war manifests a parallel information market of propaganda, illusion, dissimulation (Virilio, 2002 17). The image prevails over the real space and substitutes it, changes the landscape from tangible to audiovisual by technological accelerants satellites, internet and high gear-quality video on TV.The level of media influence is dependent on the communication forms, in which it is carried, because it is possible to prepare the discover, provided with knowledge of certain mediums utilitys (Cottle, 2003). Television with hot broadcast and reliance on spectacular images, simulacra, is in these terms the best communication weapon. It makes inefficient the object, save concentrates on its representation it is not a reality, but a winding of it (Webster, 2002). TV news is often watched with the belief that it indicates, the reality, but in point it is a version of events, shaped by journalists values and morality. The substantial reality begins and ends on television screens, and either critical attitude emerges not an true version of event, but creates other typic representation in a persist(p) images (Webster, 2002). According to Virilio (2002), the live image attracts not critiques, but emotion, apprehension. Thus it involves the attestant to the situation, makes him dependent on televisual interface, even if the problem doesnt concern him directly. All these advantages were employ strategically for the first time in the disjuncture War, which Baudrillard (1995) called both a non-existing and a first television war.Gulf War 1991 the first television warThree essays of Baudrillard, referred to events in Iraq during January and February 1991, were published originally in the passing and the Guardian and lately collected in one book The Gulf War did not take pla ce. Before the actual war, during the strengthening of American military and propaganda, he claimed that the Gulf War will not take place in reality. During the military actions his catchy slogan was that the Gulf War is not taking place and right after the operation he said that the Gulf War hadnt taken place, because the Hesperian public comprehend it just as a series of hyperreal TV images. For Baudrillard, media and especially television do not provide the opportunities for effective communication. Television is the technology of non-communication because it limits the interaction needed for symbolic exchange by giving the large amounts of signs impractical to critically analyze and react (Groening, 2007). A war demands a difference between counterparts, exchange, communication and interaction (Webster, 2002), while Baudrillard (1995) argued that the USA overloaded the symbolic communication space in this war and moreover, the goals of George Bush and Saddam ibn Talal Husse in were so different that they couldnt even be considered as counterparts. Hussein, a reason US ally, was not regarded as the real enemy, and the outcome of the war was inevitable both for participants and for hearing of war (Mann, n.d.). Researchers express the controversial idea that barrage was the most precise in history and civilian casualties thus were minimise (Kellner, 2008). Consequently, the war can be regarded as hyperreal and overloaded by media provocations.The Gulf War was understood by Paul Virilio (2002) also as a turning point in history. He called it the first information war of images, media-staged event or the first electronic war in the form of televised series, broadcast live by satellite. The difference is that Virilio accepted the idea that the war really had taken place, but it moved to the fourth front of communication weapons and instant information. He warned about the doubling of the front, a communication between place of action the Middle East a nd place of its immediate answer the whole world, which extends widely over the Iraki-Saudi b rig. Turning the domain into a business firm with the symbolic counterparts- Hussein and CNN emerges the risk of turning TV audience into fans on the stadium, counting casualties like goals of the favorite team. In comparison with Baudrillard, Virilio considers TV as establishing interactivity between those making war and those watching it. But he has the aforesaid(prenominal) idea about the role of common people in war impotent tele-spectators, victims of intelligent weapons and the people who serve them (Virilio, 2002 47).It is obvious that Baudrillard didnt intend to act like a devils advocate and decline the existence of the Gulf War. He agrees that a massive shelling of military and civil objects took place in Iraq in 1991. And lately he (2002) told readers that official casualties in Iraq were estimated in order of 100000, not counting the losses due to consequent smart and diseases. But the interrogatory is wherefore so few US soldiers died in this war, that it was named a war of zero casualties on the side of associate (Virilio, 2002 97). subsequently analyzing Baudrillards work, it becomes clear, that despite a catchy slogan in title, in particular the author compares real events with their interpretation, and the central conclusion is that the consequence of real events could scantily be named a war, while a consequence of those events representations was perceived as a real war. This effect was a main reason why he called a Gulf War the first and the perfect television war.US-led coalition relied highly on the television. On the first night of military operation, in Kourou, Ariane rocket launched two broadcasting satellites (Virilio, 2002), and it was a sign of parallel intervention of real forces and television. The leaders decisions were significantly based on intelligence reports, coming not from eye-witnesses, but from news and images. Bu sh recruited CNN and its owner Ted food turner to transit messages to Iraqi people and thus held diplomacy through interposed images (Virilio, 2002). densification forces were ordered not to get act in the direct battles with Iraqi army, but to use the means of virtual war in response to Iraqi attempts to turn the conflict into traditional. After interviewing soldiers, who were on the battlefield, Baudrillard (1995) claimed that the Western TV channels, especially CNN, offered audience highly edited reports from Iraq under the shape of live feeds. ABC News through life coverage of the Gulf War convinced the nation that Star Wars works (Bass, 2002). But Hussein use media even more cynically, creating a consequence of the images of hostages and the crying children.Attractive simulacra with no meaning behind were promoted by media of both sides the CNN journalists with the gas masks in the Jerusalem, drugged and beaten prisoners on Iraqi TV, sea-bird covered in oil and pointing eye into the Gulf sky (Baudrillard, 1995) and the quintessential symbol the Stealth F117, undetectable bomber, that zip have seen, but everyone knew. The first object, destructed by F117, was also symbolic the create of Hussein forces communication centre (Virilio, 2002). The effect could be correlated with the meat of the conflicts media coverage it is possible to see it only in time it happens, thither is no time to prepare for it and no sense to watch it afterwards. As the victims of F117 see it just in the moment of action, viewers see the live broadcasts at the same time with the military journalists.The last reasons for perceiving the Gulf War as a television war are its results. Baudrillard and Virilio agreed that nix fully lost or won in the conflict. Defeated in fact, Hussein ride outed in power and moreover won the information war. In spite of abilities given by Pentagon, CNN lost that television war, because American administration issued a document, restricting the r eal time of operations from the TV present time (Virilio, 2002). Trying to prevent the American audience from communication weapons of Iraq, US officially imposed censorship and turned the public to the search for new information sources.To conclude, Iraq in 1991 was a place not of real war, but of massive violence and a remote enough zone for creating simulacra and property a perfect television war. The TV Gulf War could have seemed a perfect simulacrum, a hyperreal situation. It is possible to partially agree with Baudrillards and Virilios argumentation, as it may be really the first example in the war history, when the TV technologies were utilise as a competent weapon and the whole war was spectacled on TV. But from the humane point of view, the recital the Gulf War did not take place undermines the seriousness of the Iraqi civilians massacre, the consequences for the political situation in Iraq and such consequence as the spread of international terrorism, which now is often perceived as the same symbolic non-event (Baudrillard, 2002) it catches the eye on TV screen when happening somewhere, but is not fully understood as possible to happen with the viewer. Nevertheless, Baudrillards theory is useful for understanding representations of other modern wars, for example, the recent conflict between tabun, southernmost Ossetia and Russia.South Ossetia 2008 media warConflict in South Ossetia will remain in the history of the post-Soviet area as a first war, which media helped to spread from the inter-country to cross-continental level. Known as Georgian-Ossetian war, the conflict in frightful 2008 turned into opponent between Georgia and USA on one side and Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. On the 8 August Georgia started a bombing of its separatist region South Ossetia. The next day Russia deployed troops in Ossetia and started military operation against Georgia. The USA government expressed eagerness to intervene, but on the 16 August t he ceasefire was signed. The actual political result is recognizing the liberty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia by several countries, leading by Russia, and high tensions in the region. The number of casualties is still discussed and differs from 160 to 2000 on Ossetian side and from 60 to 400 on Georgian.Baudrillards concept of hyperreal television war is the perfect way of understanding this simulacra-rich conflict. The date of its beginning was a sign itself it was the day of go-ahead the Olympic Games in Beijing, when by ancient traditions all the conflicts should be postponed. The violation of symbolic tradition instantly attracted the attention of worlds media. Artillery system Grad, used by Georgian forces as well as totally destructed expression of hospital in Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, became symbols of civilian massacre. The anecdotic situation, when American audience mixed the Georgia as the Caucasus country and the US state, and started panics, was spre ad by media. Russian media discussed the interview with the 12-year-old ossetian girl on the have News, where she accuses Georgia, while being roughly interrupted by the journalist (Kukolevsky, 2008). And even unwitting people remember Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, nervously chewing his necktie during the live TV interview.All those images were born by the war, which Georgian minister Temur Yakobashvili called a war for international public opinion (Collin, 2008). The media became a crucial battlefield in the conflict between Tbilisi and Moscow. The Georgian side claimed that it tried and true to reconquer its territory while Russian troops illegally invaded into it. Russians responded that Georgian government organized genocide, while Russian mission was to enforce peace. Both sides accused each other of spending millions of dollars on propaganda. Both sides even employed European PR agencies to promote their viewpoint.Georgia, backed by Western allies, from the beginn ing dominated in the information war. Started with cyberattacks and blocking of Russian TV, it used the help of USA and Great Britain, who didnt engage into real conflict, but actively engaged in the information one. All the leading global media CNN, Fox News, BBC, Sky News, Reuters, Associated Press were pro-Georgian. For example, Sky News showed a video report about the bombings of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops with a title Russia bombs the Georgian region South Ossetia (InoSmi, 2008 CNN, 2008). Georgia used a main advantage of Baudrillards television war that the world revealed the war from TV news. European audience, unaware of remote Caucasus regions, didnt know that some American and European correspondents presented the videos from Ossetian Tskinvali as the videos from Georgia (Vesti, 2009). Even Russian Foreign minister Sergej Lavrov agreed, that Russia lost that information war, but presented it as evidence, that Russia is not an aggressor, otherwise it would have prepar ed a victorious strategy (RIA Novosti, 2008).Nevertheless, I consider the results of Russian-Georgian information war as controversial as the results of real week-long conflict. The aim of attracting Western support wasnt achieved by any side. For example, German press claimed the conflict broadened the tensions between Russia and the West (Mannteufel, 2008), while some of British media found evidence of Georgia being an aggressor, guilty in war crimes (Milne, 2008). Some analysts consider Georgian media campaign as more effective because, for example, English-speaking ministers were always available for interview (Collin, 2008), but the media coverage was often favorable to Russia.The Russian strategy in this war could have been more effective, if used the overviewed simulacra images actively, because they all were really catchy and could influence the channelize audiences. Also Russia could have provided the world media with evidence of Georgian genocide by opening an access to a war zone for journalists. Moreover, it could be useful to prepare a strategic crisis communication plans for the possible conflicts of this kind. But anyway, the prohibit image of Russia, popular among Western media, could undermine by now any communication efforts. To change the situation, Russia should become a part of global media system, which is unacceptable because of American domination.The main idea of case study is that in August 2008 South Ossetia became a centre not of a real war, which end in one week, but of an information war, which lasts till now. On this battlefield a little Georgia, backed by Western transnational media, can beat the huge Russia and create herself an image of a victim of Russian military machine (Zinenko, 2008). Thus it proves the thesis of Baudrillard and Virilio, that the wars of new generation are being won or lost in the space of media and information technologies.ConclusionThe theoretical concepts of information and especially television wa rs by Baudrillard and Virilio, engaged in the essay with the real wars in Iraq 1991 and South Ossetia 2008, emerge the question of what Kellner (2005) calls a centrality of media politics in advanced foreign policy. Of course, the idea of hyperreal television war is an ideal model, and by now there was no conflict that has been totally televisual. Critiques of Baudrillard draw an attention to his hyper-postmodern approach (Hegarty, 2004) or lack of meaty political engagement (Economic expert, n.d.).Nevertheless, the fact remains in both study war cases and in numerous other conflicts of the last decades the media opened the fourth front, created a hyperreal space of mutual information attacks and marketing-style campaigns, used the simulacra-like images to influence the audience and to attract it to one side. Moreover, media become a means of searching allies or oppositely turn back to life the old confrontations, like in case of South Ossetia they emerged a new spiral of gelid War between Russia and the USA (RIA Novosti, 2008). Consequently, the governments of new generation should consider media campaigns as a part of any successful military operations, and the people, who dont want to be manipulated be spectacular images, should try to be less ignorant and more human-oriented.